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Merging and Dissolving Special Districts
Conor Clarket
Special district governments exist in every state, providing services
ranging from protection against fire to protection against fire ants. These
governments are easy to form, but often they are difficult to dissolve or
consolidate. Nevertheless, in many states, the number of special district
governments is declining. This Comment draws on statistical analyses and
interviews with government officials to explain the cause of this decline. It also
discusses how existing legal frameworks may be revised to facilitate the
efficient consolidation and dissolution of special district governments.
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Introduction
The most recent Census of Governments (Census)-a twice-a-decade
survey of the number of "governmental units"' in the country, the latest version
2
of which was released in September 2013 2confirmed what many critics of
big government would never doubt: the number of governments in the United
t Yale Law School, J.D., 2015 (expected). I'm particularly grateful to Henry
Hansmann for introducing me to this area of law. I'm also grateful to Ed Fox, Zach Liscow, and James
Dawson for our valuable discussions on this topic. Finally, I'd like to thank the editors of the Yale
Journal on Regulation-and especially Matthew Halgren-for their many excellent suggestions and
occasionally flexible deadlines.
I. In somewhat circular fashion, the Census defines a government as "an organized
entity that, in addition to having governmental character, has sufficient discretion in the management of
its own affairs to distinguish it as separate from the administrative structure of any other governmental
unit." U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 Census of Governments, Individual State Descriptions: 2012, U.S.
DEP'T COM. at v (Sept. 2013), http://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/2012isd.pdf. The Census goes on to
note that "[tlo be counted as a government, any entity must possess all three of the attributes reflected in
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States inched up from 89,527 in 2007 to 90,107 in 2012. But buried in the new
Census data was a surprising detail. In most individual states, the number of
local governments either remained flat or declined.4
Why did this happen? Some of the shift is explained by long-standing
factors, such as the ongoing consolidation of school districts.5 But much of this
recent trend is attributable to the declining growth of "special district"
governments, a Census category that includes most units of local government
that serve only one purpose, like water supply or fire protection.6 These
institutions, which are more numerous than any other kind of governmental unit
in the country,7 used to be the growth engine of American government.
Between 1952 and 1997, the number of special district governments in the
United States nearly tripled from 12,340 to 34,683-almost 500 new districts
every year.8 Over the last fifteen years, however, the growth of special districts
has slowed to less than half that,9 even as the nation's population has grown by
more than twenty million in every decade since 1950.10 In several states, the
number of special district governments is now falling fast.
These trends are surprising and intriguing. After all, there might be good
theoretical reasons to think the number of special district governments would
continue to increase across the board. In economics, the well-known Tiebout
Hypothesis suggests that diverse and fragmented local government creates
3. U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 Census of Governments, U.S. DEP'T COM. tbl.1,
http://www.census.gov/govs/cog (for all citations to tables in the 2012 Census of Governments, select
the appropriate table from dropdown menu titled "2012 Census of Governments Organization Tables:
Final" and press "Go") (last visited May 15, 2014).
4. Id.
5. Id. tbl.5.
6. The Census defines special district governments as "[a]ll organized local entities
(other than counties, municipalities, townships, or school districts) authorized by state law to provide
only one or a limited number of designated functions, and with sufficient administrative and fiscal
autonomy to qualify as separate governments; known by a variety of titles, including districts,
authorities, boards, and commissions." U.S. Census Bureau, Federal, State, & Local Governments:
Definitions, U.S. DEP'T COM., http://www.census.gov/govs/definitions/index.html (last visited May 15,
2014).
7. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 3, tbl.2.
8. Id. tbl.5.
9. Id.
10. For population totals from the 1990 Census of Population and Housing and before,
see U.S. Census Bureau, Population, Housing Units, Area Measurements, and Density: 1790 to 1990,
U.S. DEP'T COM. (Aug. 26, 1993), http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/files/table-2.pdf
For figures from 2000, see U.S. Census Bureau, United States: 2000 Summary Population and Housing
Characteristics, U.S. DEP'T CoM. 2 (Nov. 2002), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/phc-1 - I -ptl .pdf.
For figures from 2010, see U.S. Census Bureau, United States: 2010 Summary Population and Housing
Characteristics, U.S. DEP'T CoM. 2 (Jan. 2013), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph- I - I.pdf.
11. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 3, tbl.5. Notice, for example, the trends for
Georgia, Idaho, and New Jersey. This is not a universal trend, however: although Indiana lost 500




competitive pressures that benefit residents.1 2 More recently, progressive legal
scholars have touted special district governments as a key piece of American
federalism, offering democratic minorities the chance to exercise custom-
tailored local control.0
This Comment has two goals. The first is to shed some light on how and
why the growth rate in the number of special districts is changing. I do so using
unique evidence drawn from dozens of interviews and exchanges with
practitioners and officials from most states. In explaining the recent trends, I
pay particular attention to the most commonly reported cause of decline:
special district governments are increasingly consolidating and dissolving for
cost-saving reasons. The second goal is to elucidate the legal implications of
this trend. Over the course of the twentieth century, as demand for special
district governments exploded, most states codified a complicated array of
statutes for forming special districts.14 But most states still have no clear
statutory process governing mergers and dissolutions for many types of special
district governments; instead, the process is chaotic and ad hoc, and it often
requires inefficient, case-by-case legislative action.15 In a world of seemingly
increased demand for merging and dissolving special districts, states should
focus on creating simple statutory mechanisms for winding down these
institutions.
This Comment is divided into three Parts. First, I briefly discuss the
origins and features of special district governments. Second, I discuss the
apparent trend toward consolidation. I conclude by discussing statutory
implications.
I. The Origin and Rise of Special District Governments
Special districts have their origin in the public corporations that were
chartered by colonial governments in the seventeenth century.16 Early
American governments chartered these corporations to develop infrastructure
that the nascent governments did not or could not provide-such as roads,
bridges, and harbors.17 As the colonial communities became more dense and
interdependent, there was a need for regional services in decentralized
12. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416, 418 (1956) ("The greater the number of communities and the greater the variance among them, the
closer the consumer will come to fully realizing his preference position.").
13. See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 27 (2010) ("Special purpose institutions ... provide minorities with a chance to exercise voice
inside the system . . . .").
14. NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: PRIVATE
VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 53-54 (1994).
I5. Nicholas G. Bauroth, The Strange Case of the Disappearing Special Districts:
Toward a Theory ofDissolution, 40 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 568, 574 (2010).
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metropolitan outskirts. This necessity first gave rise to a new breed of
metropolitan district through a series of neighborhood collaborations in
Philadelphia, which formed region-wide districts for health, policing,
education, and other services. This basic model was soon borrowed and used in
New York, Chicago, and elsewhere.18
Several forces have propelled the growth and shaped the direction of
special districts since then. The first was a simple increase in demand. The rise
of suburbs shifted the population away from urban centers that had been the
focus of government service provision. But the new suburbanites still
demanded urban-level services outside the city.' 9 The number of special
districts began to increase rapidly in the 1930s due to new state enabling laws
and supportive policies from the Roosevelt administration, 20 and they continued
to proliferate during the second round of suburbanization that followed the
Second World War.21 While many of these new communities had the option to
incorporate new general purpose governments (such as municipalities and
townships) or be annexed by existing ones, they instead chose to receive
22services from local special districts.
Indeed, there is strong suggestive evidence that local demand plays a
large role in determining where new special districts will emerge. First, special
districts are more likely to be created in states with high population growth.23
This suggests that new residents demand new services through special district
governments. Second, special districts appear in states with growing per-capita
incomes, which is also consistent with a demand-driven element. 24
But local demand driven by demographics and income is not the only
explanation for the rise of special district governments. Distributing services
through special districts (rather than through general purpose governments) has
allowed local officials to exploit various tax and regulatory loopholes. Perhaps
the most significant of these loopholes is that special district governments can
be used to skirt legal limits imposed on a general purpose government's ability
to issue debt.25 Regardless of their origins, though, special districts are now
prevalent in every state, and they provide services that range from fire
protection to fire ant protection.26
18. Id
19. Id. at 16.
20. See BURNS, supra note 14, at 53.
21. FOSTER, supra note 16, at 19.
22. Id.
23. See Barbara Coyle McCabe, Special District Formation Among the States, 32 ST. &
Loc. Gov'T REV. 121, 125-26 (2000).
24. Id.
25. See BURNS, supra note 14, at 48.
26. Arkansas and Louisiana laws allow for the formation of "fire ant abatement




II. How and Why Do Special Districts Disappear?
Why has the growth of special district governments now slowed and, in
many states, become negative? In an attempt to shed light on the Census data, I
reached out to practitioners, government administrators, and local government
experts in all fifty states with a standardized set of questions about the trend in
each state.27 I received responses from more than forty individuals in thirty
states. While such feedback is undoubtedly anecdotal, the limited data on
special district dissolution makes such qualitative evidence especially valuable.
Because special districts provide a range of different services across states and
because there are thousands of statutes governing these organizations, it is hard
to make systematic quantitative comparisons between states.28 This is
especially true of special district dissolutions because the Census Bureau does
not track them. 29
By far the most common explanation survey respondents offered for the
decline in special district growth was that special districts are being merged or
consolidated to reduce costs. Almost all the officials I spoke with in states that
experienced a decline in special districts mentioned cost reduction as a factor,
and the ones that did not mention cost reduction expressed no opinion as to
why the number of special districts had fallen.
One practitioner in Pennsylvania, which has the fifth highest number of
special districts in the country,30 reported that the state has "seen some definite
cost saving from mergers," which were born out of a sense that special districts
"were too small to be run efficiently." He explained that these mergers are
"contributing to the trend" of special district decline in the state.3' One
27. Much of this was to gather background information and evidence for a more general
paper about single purpose governments (SPGs). See Henry Hansmann & Conor Clarke, Single-Purpose
Governments: The Dynamic Zone Between Public and Private Enterprise (April 18, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). Furthermore, I don't want to overstate the scientific features of this
survey: I got in touch with a fairly diverse and unsystematic group of people who I had reason to believe
might know about how special districts operated in the state. I asked a standard set of questions about
(1) the trend of growth or decline in a given state; (2) the reasons SPGs were created; (3) the reasons
they disappeared; (4) whether SPG functions were taken over by general purpose governments, or vice
versa; (5) what the merger or consolidation process looks like; (6) whether and why attempts to form
special districts ever fail; (7) whether SPGs could be formed without any oversight; (8) what manner of
oversight is exercised; and (9) whether variation between statutes governing different types of districts
was helpful. I also spoke with many people over the phone and asked a more free-flowing set of
questions. This process occurred in two rounds: one in spring 2013 and one in fall 2013.
28. See Sara C. Galvan, Wrestling with MUDs to Pin Down the Truth About Special
Districts, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 3041, 3041 (2007) (observing that one obstacle to studying special
districts is "the difficulty in determining a metric of assessment: [t]oo many different kinds of special
districts exist, and the scope of districts changes constantly").
29. See Bauroth, supra note 15, at 569 ("Unfortunately, the U.S. Bureau of the Census
does not monitor district dissolutions and few states track their districts from formation through
dissolution. As a result, there is a tendency by researchers to discount its importance and regularity
altogether.").
30. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 3, tbl.5.
31. Telephone Interview with Joseph M. Sullivan, Dir. of Educ. & Training, Pa. Mun.
Auths. Assoc. (Oct. 7, 2013).
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government official in West Virginia reported a "sense that the districts were
inefficient, too small" and that if "they could go a little bit larger, they would
find economies of scale." 32 As an example, this official explains, "A lot of them
didn't have full time staff and office hours. It was inconvenient to the public." 33
New legislation also seems to be driving this trend. In Georgia, where the
number of special district governments has dropped by more than ten percent
since the 2007 Census,34 one official reports that restructuring is "in part due to
legislation that mandates higher levels of coordination between local
governments." 35 This law, known as the Service Delivery Strategy Act, is
intended "to minimize inefficiencies resulting from duplication of services and
competition between local governments and to provide a mechanism to resolve
disputes" between them. 3 In Oregon, where the number of special districts has
flattened after huge increases in the three decades prior to 2007,37 state
guidelines make clear that "[m]ergers and consolidations are designed to
promote efficiency in providing governmental service" and are encouraged by
state law.38
A trend toward consolidation and annexation for the sake of cost saving
would be consistent with the experience of other areas of government. For
example, school districts have experienced enormous consolidation over the
last several decades-the number has declined steadily since the Census began
counting them 39 -and there is some evidence indicating that consolidation is
linked to reduced education costs.40 It is also consistent with one side of the
long-running debate over the costs and benefits of government fragmentation.
While an important tradition in the public choice literature maintains that more
fragmented government means more competition41 and a closer fit between
42voter preferences and government services, an equally strong tradition has
maintained that fragmented governments fail to take advantage of economies of
32. Telephone Interview with Amy Swann, Div. Dir., Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Va.
(Apr. 4, 2013).
33. Id.
34. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 3, tbl.5.
35. E-mail from Harry W. Hayes, Senior Pub. Serv. Assoc., Carl Vinson Inst. of Gov't,
to author (Oct. 9, 2013, 10:57 EDT) (on file with author).
36. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-70-20 (2012).
37. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 3, tbl.5.
38. Special District Management and Policy Resource Guide, OR. FIRE DISTRICT
DIRECTORS ASS'N & SPECIAL DISTRICTS Ass'N OR. 185 (2009), http://www.ofdda.com/PDF/2009%20
DIRECTOR'S%20GUIDE.pdf.
39. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 3, tbl.5.
40. See Marvin E. Dodson Ill & Thomas A. Garrett, Inefficient Education Spending in
Public School Districts: A Case for Consolidation?, 22 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 270, 271 (2004);
William Duncombe & John Yinger, Does School District Consolidation Cut Costs?, 2 EDUC. FIN. &
POL'Y 341, 345 (2007).
41. See Thomas J. Dilorenzo, The Expenditure Effects of Restricting Competition in
Local Public Service Industries: The Case ofSpecial Districts, 37 PUB. CHOICE 569, 570-71 (1981).




scale and sometimes produce a duplication of service providers in a single
area.43
It is not entirely clear why the push for consolidation is happening now.
One possibility is that the recent recession produced a sudden drop in demand
for services provided by special districts, although that seems doubtful since the
rate of growth began to taper off well before the mortgage market did. It could
also be driven by long term population trends: as population density increases,
it becomes easier to take advantage of economies of scale, a fact that seems to
have been relevant to the dramatic decline in the number of school districts
over the course of the twentieth century.44 But my favored explanation is that
special districts are a relatively new form of government still struggling to find
an equilibrium: they exploded in popularity only in the middle of the twentieth
century, but perhaps many of the communities they serve have now reached or
passed their saturation points for services provided by these districts.
III. Implications of the Decline: Merger Statutes
As the demand for special district governments grew over the course of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most states developed
statutory schemes that allowed for the relatively easy incorporation of these
entities.45 These statutes meant that forming a local government no longer
required a special legislative act. One recent count of enabling laws in
California, for example, found 206 statutes that enabled 55 varieties of special
districts, which in turn provided 30 different types of services.46 While often
numerous and complex, these statutes nonetheless streamlined the process of
creating special districts. 47
But these statutory schemes were designed for a world in which the
number of special district governments was growing boundlessly across the
country. Every single state in the nation has at least one statute that governs the
formation of local governments,48 but many states have no statutory guidance
whatsoever on how to dissolve or merge certain types of special district
governments. 49 This is not necessarily surprising, since one of the main reasons
special district governments developed was as an alternative for suburbanites
who wanted to avoid merging with neighboring urban general purpose
43. See Suzanne M. Leland & Gary A. Johnson, Consolidation as a Local Government
Reform, in CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 25, 29 (Jered B. Carr & Richard C.
Feiock eds., 2004).
44. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Kenny & Amy B. Schmidt, The Decline in the Number of
School Districts in the U.S.: 1950-1980, 79 PUB. CHOICE 1 (1994).
45. See BURNS, supra note 14, at 53-54.
46. FOSTER, supra note 16, at 11.
47. See BURNS, supra note 14, at 123.
48. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 1.
49. Bauroth, supra note 15, at 574.
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governments.50 But in a world where growth in the number of special districts
is slowing, states need statutory schemes that contemplate merger and
dissolution for these districts.
As it stands, there is a gap between states with and without merger
statutes. For example, there are at least three different ways to merge or annex
special districts in the state of Oregon: with petitions from two special districts
that want to merge,51 with petitions from a special district (or districts) and a
city that proposes to annex the district,52 or with a resolution of the boards of
two or more districts. In Rhode Island, by contrast, one official reported that
"[tihe process is whatever the parties wish it to be-there are no state statutes
governing the process." 54 In Virginia, a former official could recall "no
statutory provisions for the consolidation of special districts" and noted that
"[c]onsolidation would require the legislature [to act] to allow the merger of
two or more districts."55 Indeed, Virginia's documents list numerous ways to
expand special districts but none to merge most types of special districts. 56
This problem is not limited to a few states. According to a 2009 study, all
but six states have dissolution procedures that are "unclear or nonexistent" for
at least one category of special district government.57 Nor does the lack of
clarity affect only districts that provide certain sorts of services. Just under a
quarter of all statutes governing special districts do not have procedures for
dissolving the entities they authorize, an omission that cuts across all types of
special districts.58
These statutory differences matter. Just as the presence of enabling
statutes is strongly correlated with the appearance of special districts, 59 it
should come as no surprise that the presence of flexible rules for dissolution
and consolidation is'also positively correlated with the frequency of dissolution
and changes to district boundaries.60
The lack of state dissolution and merger provisions is also at odds with
how state law treats other kinds of organizations that are enabled by statute. For
50. FOSTER, supra note 16, at 19.
51. OR. REV. STAT. § 198.895(1) (2013).
52. OR. REv. STAT. § 198.895(3)-(4) (2013).
53. OR. REV. STAT. § 198.895(5) (2013).
54. E-mail from Dan Beardsley, Exec. Dir., R.I. League of Cities & Towns, to author
(Sept. 30, 2013, 10:28 EDT) (on file with author).
55. E-mail from Ted McCormack, Former Assistant Dir., Va. Comm'n on Local Gov't,
to author (Oct. 7, 2013, 11:59 EDT) (on file with author).
56. See generally Discretionary Authorities and Special Districts Available to Local
Governments in Virginia, COMMISSION ON LOC. GOv'T (April 2009), http://www.dhcd.virginia.gov/Co
mmissiononLocalGovemment/PDFs/Authorities.pdf (describing the lack of consolidation authority
possessed by the districts themselves).
57. Bauroth, supra note 15, at 574.
58. Id. at 575-76.
59. See FOSTER, supra note 16, at 220.
60. Bauroth, supra note 15, at 589 ("[T]he greater the freedom allowed by the state at




example, state codes provide simple rules for both the formation and merger of
business corporations.61 While some of the motivations behind corporate
merger laws do not apply to special districts (avoiding monopoly, for example),
corporations and special districts share a common ancestor (as discussed in Part
I) and a similar need for clear rules governing how organizations and their
assets are combined.
Some of the problems created by this legal void might sound like simple
inconvenience: in the absence of a statute that creates a formal process, a
district or its residents can still effect a merger, annexation, or dissolution by
petitioning the legislature for a special action. But in the context of forming and
dissolving governments, these simple hurdles exacerbate a preexisting
collective action problem. The benefits of forming or merging a government
are widely shared (the whole community benefits from the new service or the
savings from eliminating it), but the costs (petitions, legislation, and
administrative work) burden only a small number of people.62 Simple, general
enabling statutes are the mechanism by which states reduce the impact of this
collective action problem.
Kentucky's recent experience offers a particularly notable example of the
set of problems that arise from the lack of ways to eliminate or merge
undesirable special districts. At the end of 2012, in the wake of recent reports
of scandals and excessive costs, the state auditor released a report on special
district governments in the state.63 (These scandals included a single fire
department that had $123,000 in questionable expenses, including $839 spent
on fireworks.6) The report noted that there was widespread confusion in the
state about the number of special districts, the services they provided, and the
authorities (if any) to which they were accountable, but there was no
mechanism by which citizens could improve them. The report observed that
state laws "identify the process to create various types of districts," but it
concluded that these laws were "inconsistent or silent regarding the legal
process to dissolve many different types of districts."65 In particular, the report
found that basic questions about how to wind up special districts "cannot be
61. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2013) (providing Delaware's rules
governing mergers).
62. See BURNS, supra note 14, at 17.
63. See Adam H. Edelen, Ghost Government: A Report on Special Districts in
Kentucky, OFF. KY. AUDITOR PUB. ACCTS. (Nov. 14, 2012),
http://apps.auditor.ky.gov/public/theregistry/2012GhostGovemmentSpecialDistrictsReport.pdf; Beth
Musgrave, Report: Special Taxing Districts in Ky. Collect $1.5 Billion a Year with Little Oversight,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Nov. 14, 2012, http://www.kentucky.com/2012/1 1/14/2407554/report-sp
ecial-taxing-districts.html.
64. Melissa Maynard, Cash-Strapped Governments Turn to Special Districts, USA
TODAY, Oct. 2, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/02/cash-strapped-govemme
nts-tum-to-special districts/2907207.
65. See Edelen, supra note 63, at 20.
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conclusively answered because current law is vague or does not exist in many
instances."66
The process for consolidating a special district should be at least as easy
as the process for forming one. In addition to the collective action problem
described above, merger and dissolution present a further difficulty. Once a
community creates a special district-with a staff and budget of its own-it
creates an entrenched interest opposed to merger or dissolution efforts. These
problems might explain why consolidation procedures are rarely used even in
some of the states where they are available.67 Indeed, even when there is
widespread dissatisfaction with a district's service or cost, opposition from the
district itself can sometimes defeat a push to merge or dissolve it. These
issues, combined with the general collective action problem, present a strong
justification for states to add clear, simple merger and dissolution provisions to
their statutes-and perhaps even clever defaults beyond that. In Pennsylvania,
for example, all municipal authorities need to take affirmative steps every fifty
years to avoid dissolution.69
But the simplest rule for consolidation or dissolution would be one that
mirrored the rule for incorporating the special district. While there are open
questions about the appropriate rule for incorporating special districts, 70 there
are several strong arguments for symmetry even without engaging the
incorporation question. One reason is simplicity: if the rule for incorporation
and dissolution is the same, there is only one rule to be learned. Second, this
seems to be the most popular dissolution rule among statutes that include any
dissolution provision,71 and there is little evidence that it creates problems. A
final and related point is that there is no particularly good reason for dissolution
and incorporation rules to differ within a single jurisdiction; indeed, this
disconnect seems to cut across geography and function with no apparent
logic.72 Simplification and unification would be desirable.
There are some good examples of statutes like this. Oregon's statute,
described above, offers residents great flexibility in how they merge and
dissolve their local governments. It features simple procedures that broadly
mirror-and that are in some respects less demanding than-the rules for
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Galvan, supra note 28, at 3073 n. 195 (noting that "[t]he author could find
no evidence of any past consolidations" among municipal utility districts in Texas even though state law
provides a mechanism for consolidation).
68. See Maynard, supra note 64.
69. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5623 (West 2008).
70. See Hansmann & Clarke, supra note 27.
71. See Bauroth, supra note 15, at 577 ("For a majority of district statutes, though, the
dissolution process does indeed mirror the incorporation process.").
72. Id. at 576-77. Note that increasing the ease of dissolution might seem to be at odds
with frequently celebrated benefits of local government such as local experimentation and local control.
But this might not be the case since costly and vague dissolution requirements may prevent the




formation, and these procedures cut across all district types.73 In other words,
fire and water districts do not need to dissolve themselves differently from one
another.
The suggestion that an increase in special district mergers demonstrates a
need for merger statutes might seem paradoxical. After all, if mergers are on
the rise, why do we need statutes to enable them? But state enabling statutes
have a long history of responding to such changes in demand; indeed, the
increased demand for special districts in the early twentieth century was one of
the reasons states started passing special district enabling laws in the first place.
At the same time, the state laws that regulate local government are not subject
to the same evolutionary pressures that affect those governing, say, business
corporations. Businesses can incorporate elsewhere in response to state
statutory changes (so states must compete for their business), but when faced
with inefficient special district government, it is much harder for families to do
the same. The good news is they may not have to-if states align their laws
with the changing times.
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73. Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 198.830 (2013) (describing formation), with OR. REV.
STAT. § 198.895 (2013) (describing merger and consolidation), and OR. REV. STAT. § 198.920 (2013)
(describing dissolution).

